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Abstract: Schopenhauer's treatment of aesthetics forms one of the central aspects of his wider philosophical
world-view. Although the treatment is both insightful and sensitive, the analysis of the creative genius connects
it  to  the  more  peripheral  examination  of  madness  in  a  way  that  threatens  to  undermine  Schopenhauer's
conception of the self. Madness is characterised by discontinuity of an individual's self, inviting a comparison
with the transition into pure subjectivity from everyday empirical subjectivity during aesthetic contemplation. A
comparison to madness is even more relevant to the genius, whose exposure to the sublime elements of nature
parallels the madman's exposure to the horrific. By comparing the principle of madness with that of the aesthetic
state, that which preserves our identity throughout our change in subjectivity can be brought into question. As
Schopenhauer argues our knowledge of the Will is insufficient, an appeal to this as the source of continuity is
unsatisfactory.
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Resumo:  O tratamento  da estética  de  Schopenhauer  forma um dos aspectos  centrais  de  sua  extensa visão
filosófica de mundo. Apesar do tratamento ser perspicaz e sensível, a análise do gênio criativo conecta-se com o
mais periférico exame da loucura no sentido em que ameaça solapar a concepção de Schopenhauer do eu. A
loucura é  caracterizada pela  descontinuidade do  self  do  indivíduo,  que  convida  a  uma comparação  com a
transição para a pura subjetividade da empírica subjetividade cotidiana durante a contemplação estética. Uma
comparação com a loucura é até mais relevante para o gênio cuja exposição aos elementos sublimes da natureza
está em paralelo com a exposição ao horrível que o louco é exposto. Ao comparar o princípio da loucura com o
do estado estético, pode ser colocado em questão o que preserva a nossa identidade em toda a nossa mudança na
subjetividade. Como Schopenhauer argumenta nosso conhecimento sobre a vontade é insuficiente, um apelo a
isto como a fonte de continuidade é insatisfatório.
 
Palavras-chave: Estética; Loucura; Gênio artístico.
One  of  the  most  remarkable  aspects  of  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  is  his  sensitive  and
insightful treatment of the arts, and how this is related to his notion of the metaphysical will which lies
beneath the world of phenomena. It is in the discussion of the arts that Schopenhauer takes a controlled
digression on the topic of the madman; he whose inability to cope with encounters with the horrific
leads to a fragmentation in their personal history, the interruptions of which are smoothed over by
more acceptable fictions.
In discussing the genius, who enters into the state of aesthetic reflection far more than most due
to his exceptional powers of perception and imagination, Schopenhauer comments that the categories
of genius and madman lie in close conceptual proximity. After a brief exposition of Schopenhauer's
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metaphysics and his arguments for idealism which serve as the background for his  aesthetics,  his
treatment of art, genius, and madness will be examined. It will be argued that the madman and the
most successful genius both have encounters with the horrific which lead to a serious interruption in
their continuity of the subject. For the madman, it concerns the formulation and acceptance of fictional
memories.  For  the  genius,  it  concerns  a  temporary  cessation  of  their  state  of  being  as  empirical
character while they assume the state of pure subjectivity. The states of empirical and pure subjectivity
are radically  different,  and there are issues regarding their  relation and the transition from one to
another  that  need to  be  examined.  It  will  be  concluded that  to  account  for  the  continuity  of  the
individual throughout these transitions, an appeal to the will as that which remains fundamentally the
same is required. However, given that Schopenhauer seems to acknowledge that we are incapable of
possessing  adequate  knowledge  of  the  will,  this  appears  problematic.  That  which  enables  the
continuity of the genius as an individual thus poses more questions than it answers.
The World as Representation
Schopenhauer begins his treatise with the assertion of a claim which, despite appearing to be
counter-intuitive, he believes ''everyone must recognise as true as soon as he understands it, although it
is not a proposition that everyone understands as soon as he hears it''1. This is the claim that ''the whole
of  this  world,  is  only  object  in  relation  to  the  subject,  perception  of  the  perceiver,  in  a  word,
representation...  Everything  that  in  any  way  belongs  and  can  belong  to  the  world  is  inevitably
associated with this being conditioned by the subject, and it exists only for the subject. The world is
representation''.2 To argue his case Schopenhauer presents an account of transcendental idealism which
is arguably both more convincing and accessible than Kant's, though Schopenhauer's claims that his
philosophy is the logical result of insights Kant failed to develop properly is contentious.
The central claim of Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism is ''the doctrine that space, time,
and causality belong not to the thing-in-itself, but only to the phenomenon, that they are only the forms
of  our  knowledge,  not  qualities  of  the  thing-in-itself''3.  They  are  the  a  priori  conditions  of  all
experience. As such, it is impossible to have an experience of the world without them. To illustrate
how this  works,  and to  connect  Kant's  epistemological  theory  to  contemporary  scientific  enquiry,
1 The World as Will and Representation, Volume II p. 3 (Hereafter referred to parenthetically as WWV followed by volume
and page number respectively)
2 WWV, I, 3. It  is important to note that Schopenhauer, by claiming the world of experience is phenomenal, was not
denying empirical reality. Rather, he insisted on the ''compatibility of empirical reality with transcendental ideality'' (WWV,
I,  4).  What  he  argued  for  was  there  being  something  independent  of  human experience,  more  fundamental  than  the
phenomenon we experience.
3 WWV, I, 134.
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Schopenhauer applied the principle of the understanding structuring our experience to the study of
optics. According to Schopenhauer, ''the  understanding is the artist forming the work, whereas the
senses are merely the assistants who hand up the materials''4. Without the understanding, ''we should
see the object inverted... but intuitive perception is brought about by the fact that the understanding
instantly refers the impression felt on the retina to its cause which then precisely in this way presents
itself as an object in space that is its accompanying form of intuition''5.
This illustration is appropriate as no matter how much we know about the function of the eye
we have no access to the unmodified impression of an inverted object. We may gain knowledge of the
process, but that process is nevertheless sealed off from us. Also, rather than being something that is
learned or habituated by experience, this necessary activity of the understanding is simply something
that is in its nature to perform. The understanding applies space, time and causality to our experiences
in a similar way. They are an essential feature of all experience and it is impossible to go beyond them
and perceive what the world is like in an unmodified state.
Schopenhauer took it as evident that the doctrine of transcendental realism, that space, time,
and causality  are  necessary  features  of  the  external  world,  appears  to  be  intuitive  because  of  the
illusory nature of experience. For example, the illusion of space pervades all experience as we assume
there to be a distance between the 'I' as perceiver and the object. This is nothing but the understanding's
attempt to render experience intelligible:
the understanding summons to its assistance  space, the form of the  outer sense also
lying predisposed in the intellect, i.e., in the brain. This it does in order to place that
cause  outside the organism; for only in this way does there arise for it  an outside
whose  possibility  is  simply  space,  so  that  pure  intuition  a  priori  must  supply  the
foundation for empirical perception6 (PSR, 77-8).
In truth, all we really know is the agitation of our sense organs. As Schopenhauer writes in his
opening paragraph, we do ''not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that
feels an earth''7. However, these ''deceptive illusions stand before us in immediate perception [and]
cannot be removed by any arguments of reason... the illusions remains unshakeable... in spite of all
abstract knowledge''8.
Schopenhauer turned to Kant for arguments to help dispel these illusions of transcendental
4 Schopenhauer, The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, p. 114.
5 Ibid., p. 242.
6 Ibid., pp. 77-78
7 WWV, I, 3.
8 WWV, I, 25.
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realism, though accused him of not taking his arguments far enough. For example, he refers to the
arguments  of the ''Transcendental  Aesthetic''  from the  Critique of  Pure Reason as  having ''such a
complete  power of  conviction that  I  number its  propositions  among the incontestable  truths''9 but
considers those truths limited. This is because they do not logically entail transcendental idealism; it
remains possible that space and time exist in the world. The world in-itself may coincide with our
perceptions, though this is something we could not verify.
Stronger  inspiration  was  to  come  from  the  ''Antinomies  of  Pure  Reason'',  wherein  Kant
attempts to demonstrate that ''that objective order in time, space, causality, matter, and so on, on which
all events of the real world ultimately rest, cannot even be conceived, when closely considered, as a
self-existing  order,  i.e.,  an  order  of  things-in-themselves...  [as]  it  leads  to  contradictions''10.  While
Schopenhauer agreed with the points Kant was trying to make, he claimed that ''the whole antinomy is
merely a sham fight''11 and that the ''proof of the thesis in all four antinomies is everywhere only a
sophism''12.  In ''Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy'', Schopenhauer provides alternative arguments
against the transcendental realism of time, space and causality.
If we assume that time is real and has a starting point, marking the origins of the universe, we
are entitled to ask the difficult question of what came before it. Also, if it has an end, we are equally
entitled to ask what happens afterwards. On the other hand, Schopenhauer argues that there cannot be
infinite time as ''the changes of the world absolutely and necessarily presuppose an infinite series of
changes retrogressively [so that] nothing at all is advanced [as] we cannot by any means imagine the
possibility of an absolute beginning''13. These arguments apply both to infinite time and an infinite
causal chain. Similarly, if we assume that space is real and has limits we can ask what exists beyond
them. If we assume space is real and unlimited, the universe itself becomes unintelligible as, to quote
Magee's  summary, ''to exist,  an entity must have an identity,  and there cannot be identity without
limits'' hence ''the universe cannot be infinite in extent and still be''14.
The assumptions of transcendental realism therefore present the universe as something which
cannot be determinately intelligible. If we assume space, time and causality to be real and limited we
are presented with the problematic issue of what is on the other side of their boundaries. If we assume
them as unlimited, we are presented with problems of the universe's identity and infinite regress.
9 WWV, I, 437.
10 WWV, II, 8.
11 WWV, I, 493.
12 WWV, I, 493-4.
13 WWV, I, 494-5.
14 MAGEE, B. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, p. 90.
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Idealism and evolution
If we return to Schopenhauer's study of optics we can clearly see that he views the perceptual
functions of the understanding, which maintains the illusion that the world ''exists extended in space
and  time  and  continues  to  move  regularly  according  to  the  strict  rules  of  causality,''  are  ''only  a
physiological phenomenon, a function of the brain''15. We may recall that these categories are ''lying
predisposed in the intellect, i.e., in the brain''16 to be drawn upon by the understanding.
That the brain is in some way hard-wired to propagate the illusions of transcendental realism is
one  of  Schopenhauer's  most  original  arguments.  The  suggestion  that  it  is  a  product  of  human
adaptation  to  a  demanding  and  competitive  environment  is  startlingly  prescient;  presenting  an
anticipation of Darwin's  Origin of Species, which appeared shortly after Volume II of  The World as
Will and Representation.17
Schopenhauer believed that ''every plant is well adapted to its soil and climate, every animal to
its element and to the prey that is to become its food, that prey also being protected to a certain extent
against its natural hunter''18. To encourage the flourishing of organic life, nature ''has equipped every
animal with the organs necessary for its maintenance and support, with the weapons necessary for its
conflict''19. To the higher animals nature ''imparted to each the most important of the organs directed
outwards, namely the brain with its function, i.e., the intellect''. For these animals ''a wider range of
vision, a more accurate comprehension, a more correct distinction of things in the external world in all
their circumstances and relations were here required. Accordingly, we see the powers of representation
and their organs, brain, nerves, and organs of sense, appear more and more perfect, the higher we
ascend in the scale of animals; and in proportion as the cerebral system develops, does the external
world appear in consciousness ever more distinct, many-sided, and complete. The comprehension of
the world now demands more and more attention...''20.
It  therefore  seems  that  transcendental  realism  is  the  most  conducive  to  our  survival.
Split-second decisions needed to be made to successfully navigate the world to find food and shelter,
and  the  most  direct  way  of  doing  this  is  to  act  according  to  the  assumption  of  space,  time  and
causality's  externality.  However,  the  human  became  so  complex  that  ''the  requirements  for  the
15 WWV, II, 285.
16 SCHOPENHAUER, A. The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, p. 77.
17 Darwin's theory is, of course, more fleshed out than Schopenhauer's and there are important disparities. Not least of all is
Schopenhauer's belief in the parallel evolution of the circumstances of life, i.e. the environment, to meet the needs of the
species (see WWV, I, 159).
18 WWV, II, 159.
19 WWV, II, 279.
20 WWV, II, 279.
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attainment of [its goals] were so greatly increased, enhanced, and specified, that an incomparably more
important enhancement of the intellect than that offered by previous stages was necessary, or at any
rate was the easiest means of attaining the end''21.
The human being has become so sophisticated that the intellect required to attain its complex
goals has developed to the point where abstract reflection on the nature of reality is possible. That we
live according to transcendental realism but ought to philosophise according to transcendental idealism
may explain why its conclusions are so counter-intuitive.
The Insufficiency of Natural Science
The natural world of phenomena is, then, a world of representation. The world of space-time
phenomena is created by the mind, and it is for this reason Schopenhauer considers the fundamental
reality of it to be beyond the comprehension of the natural sciences. These can identify and describe
the forces at work in the world, such as magnetism, electricity and gravity, but they fail to explain why
they are present; ''all natural sciences at bottom achieves nothing more than what is also achieved by
botany,  namely...  classification''22.  He argues  that  the  sciences  engage  in  a  reductive  materialism,
attempting to explain everything in terms of physical cause and effect. ''But then the effectiveness of
every cause is referred to a law of nature, and this law in the end to a force of nature, which remains as
the absolutely inexplicable. This inexplicable... just betrays that the whole nature of such explanation
is only conditional... and is by no means the real and sufficient one''23. As natural science cannot probe
the nature of the forces to which they attribute governance of natural phenomena, it remains something
of a tragic enterprise:  ''The force itself  that is manifested,  the inner nature of the phenomena that
appear in accordance with those laws, remain for [science] an eternal secret, something entirely strange
and unknown''24.
Schopenhauer  was  against  the  idea  that  all  phenomena could  be  explained in  terms of  an
underlying physical structure. Young points out that Schopenhauer is compelled to adopt the ''pure
potentiality'' view of forces, which posits the fundamental forces of nature as ''entities whose powers
are devoid of structural ground''25, a view he suggests is supported by the entities postulated by modern
field theory. He inherited a view, running from Boscovich, through Priestly to Kant, that ''matter itself
21 WWV, II, 279-80.
22 WWV, II, 174.
23 WWV, II, 176.
24 WWV, I, 97.
25 YOUNG, J. Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, p. 43.
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is not extended, and consequently is incorporeal''26. This lack of a physical structure places it beyond
the limits of what natural science can achieve. The relevance this has to Schopenhauer's transcendental
idealism  is  that  ''matter  is  throughout  pure  causality;  its  essence  is  action  in  general'' 27.  As
Schopenhauer goes on to say elsewhere,
The subjective correlative matter or of causality, for the two are one and the same, is
the  understanding,  and it  is  nothing more than this.  To know causality is  the sole
function of the understanding, its only power, and it is a great power embracing much,
manifold in its  applications,  and yet  unmistakable  in  its  identity  throughout all  its
manifestations. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole
of  reality,  is  only  for  the  understanding,  through  the  understanding,  in  the
understanding28.
The Will
As such, natural science is insufficient for probing the fundamental nature of the forces which
govern reality. If we remain on ''the path of objective knowledge [i.e., science], thus starting from the
representation, we shall never get beyond the representation, i.e. the phenomenon. We shall therefore
remain on the outside of things: we shall never be able to penetrate their inner nature and investigate
what they are in themselves''29.
The inner nature of physical objects is unknowable objectively. Schopenhauer points out that
this  is  applicable  to  human bodies  in  so  far  as  when,  viewed objectively,  the  human ''body is  a
representation like any other, an object among objects''30. As such, its ''movements and actions... would
be equally strange and incomprehensible to him [as] he would see his conduct follow on presented
motives with the constancy of a law of nature, just as the changes of other objects follow upon causes,
stimuli, and motives''31.
However, the human body is utterly unique as it is also knowable from the inside. It is the only
physical  object  of  which  we can  have  both  objective  and subjective  knowledge.  Whereas  natural
science is an enterprise which views phenomena from a third-person perspective, our body provides a
first-person perspective of ''an object among objects''. It provides the subject with ''the key to his own
phenomenon,  reveals  to  him...  the  inner  mechanism  of  his  being,  his  actions,  his  movements''32.
26 WWV, II, 308.
27 SCHOPENHAUER, A. The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason p. 119
28 WWV, I, 11.
29 WWV, II, 195.
30 WWV, I, 99.
31 WWV, I, 99-100.
32 WWV, I, 100.
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Schopenhauer therefore claims that ''my body is the only object of which I know not merely the one
side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called will''33. The term 'will' is more general
than its usual connotations, referring
not only willing and deciding in the narrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing,
shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, in short all that directly constitutes our own
weal and woe, desire and disinclination'34.
Julian  Young  points  out  that  it  covers  all  psychological  states  that  contain  an  element  of
''action-directedness''35. Direct acts of will in the narrow sense of volitions ''determine actions'' whereas
''desires and emotions, pleasures and pains,... tend to action: they grow into action''36. However, this is
somewhat misleading as Schopenhauer was keen to emphasise that the ''act of will and the action of
the body are not two different states [and that] they do not stand in the relation of cause and effect...
The action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception'' 37. A
desire does not lead to an action; the action is the desire as an objective phenomena. Also, acts of will
do not, as Young states, ''grow into action''. Schopenhauer argued that we do not will future actions:
''Resolutions of the will relating to the future are mere deliberations of reasons about what will be
willed at some time, not real acts of will''38.
Young goes on to point out that the will is a subjective analogue to the forces of nature which
govern the behaviour of objects. The inner knowledge of our body tells us that the will ''plays exactly
the same role here as is played by the mysterious forces of nature which underlie the course of events
in a physical or chemical causal chain''39. Another similarity is between human character and natural
forces. Character is our disposition to respond to certain stimuli in certain ways. Young also points out
that ''intelligent and patient observation'' is required to ''discover the powers and dispositions of a given
body'', and this applies to character and natural force40.
The Will Extended
33 WWV, I, 124.
34 WWV, II, 202.
35 YOUNG, Willing and Unwilling, p. 51.
36 Ibid.
37 WWV, II, 100. Also, ''I say that between the act of will and the bodily action there is no causal connection whatever; on
the contrary,  the two are directly one and the same thing''  (SCHOPENHAUER, A.  Fourfold Root of  the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, pp. 114-5).
38 WWV, I, 100.
39 WWV, II, 249.
40 YOUNG, J. Willing and Unwilling, p. 57.
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However,  it  becomes  apparent  that  the  will  is  not  merely  analogous  to  natural  forces.
Schopenhauer, after arguing that the will is the inner nature of the phenomena of the human body,
extends the notion to cover the inner nature of all phenomena. As Magee points out, Schopenhauer's
extended use of the term 'will' is responsible for all sorts of misunderstandings of his philosophy. As
the term's connotations suggest the possession of a personality, or at least complex mental states, the
extension of the will to other humans, who we see only objectively, does not require much of the
reader. Solipsism is not something that Schopenhauer appeared to take too seriously, pointing out that
we should ''regard this sceptical argument of theoretical egoism, which here confronts us, as a small
fortress. Admittedly the fortress is impregnable, but the garrison can never sally forth from it, and
therefore we can pass it by and leave it in our rear without danger''41.
The extension of the will to cover  all phenomena is much more demanding. Magee suggests
that for this purpose, 'force' or 'energy' would be preferable42. While Young responds to this by pointing
out Schopenhauer's insistence on the concept of 'force' being subsumed under that of 'will'43, Magee is
surely right that 'energy' would be preferable as ''we now know that matter and energy are equivalent;
that at the subatomic level the concept of matter dissolves completely into the concept of energy''44,
and that the ''whole universe is the objectification of this force [and] are phenomenal manifestations of
a single underlying drive which ultimately is undifferentiated''45. The use of modern physics to support
Schopenhauer's equivocation of matter and force is compelling, as is the attention Magee brings to the
fact that Erwin Schrodinger was an enthusiastic Schopenhaurian, but to avoid confusion the use of
'will' will be maintained throughout.
An important part of Schopenhauer's extension of the will is that the human actions to which
we  have  privileged  access  is  a  manifestation  of  the  will,  rather  than  the  converse:  ''in
self-consciousness the known, consequently the will, must be the first and original thing; the knower,
consequently the will, must be only the secondary thing, that which has been added the mirror''46. A
large part of the will which governs us is unaccompanied by consciousness, meaning our inner nature
only provides  a  limited insight  into that  which it  expresses.  That  the will  is  often unconscious  is
important for Schopenhauer's extension of the term to the rest of organic matter, as ''we see at once
from the instinct and mechanical skill of animals that the will is also active where it is [accompanied,
41 WWV, I, 104.
42 MAGEE, B. The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, p. 144.
43 YOUNG, J. Willing and Unwilling, pp. 64-65.
44 MAGEE, B. The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, p. 145.
45 Ibid., p. 139.
46 WWV, II, 202.
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but] not guided by any knowledge''47. The will is also apparent in the more fundamental ''vital and
vegetative processes, digestion, circulation, secretion, growth, and reproduction''48. Beyond animals, it
''appear[s] as the tendency to life, the love of life, vital energy; it is the same thing that makes the plant
grow''49. The process of ''vegetation, as [a] blindly urging force, will be taken by us, accordingly to [be
the plant's] inner nature, to be will''50.
Schopenhauer then makes the more questionable extension of the will to the ''phenomena of the
inorganic world, which are the most remote of all from us''51. In humans and animals, the will ''pursues
its ends by the light of knowledge'', whereas in inorganic nature, ''in the feeblest of its phenomena, [the
will] only strives blindly in a dull, one-sided, and unalterable manner''52. This is manifest in the laws of
nature such as gravity and magnetism, between which we can see, as in the rest of nature, ''contest,
struggle, and the fluctuation of victory''53. Thus the phenomenal world is governed by the same inner
nature which governs the human, which is, Schopenhauer frequently reminds us, ''a representation like
any other, an object among objects''54. As such,
everyone in this twofold regard is the whole world itself, the microcosm; he finds his
two sides whole and complete within himself. And what he thus recognizes as his own
inner being also exhausts the inner being of the whole world, of the macrocosm55.
Young points out that Schopenhauer's extension of the will to inorganic matter is motivated by
''the  quest  for  a  higher  genus under  which to  subsume all  the  species  in  nature''  in  order  to  find
knowledge  of  what  is  identical  throughout56.  This  search  for  a  law  of  homogeneity  prevents  a
bifurcation between the organic and inorganic realms, and allows Schopenhauer's metaphysics to be
all-encompassing.
Schopenhauer, after establishing the presence of will in all objects through analogy, argues for
their numerical identity. All of nature, from inanimate and inorganic matter, to plants, animals, and
finally humans, are manifestations of the same will. One argument for this is that plurality ''in general
47 WWV, II, 114.
48 WWV, I, 115.
49 WWV, II, 359.
50 WWV, I, 117.
51 WWV, I, 117.
52 WWV, I, 118.
53 WWV, I, 146. Importantly, the realm of inorganic nature is most obviously governed by causes rather than motives. It is
in this sense that Schopenhauer refers to the will as 'blind'.
54 WWV, I, 99.
55 WWV, I, 162.
56 YOUNG, J. Willing and Unwilling, p. 69.
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is necessarily conditioned by space and time''57 and, being subject to the transcendental conditions of
experience, ''applies not to the will, but only to its phenomenon''58. The concept of numerical plurality
is one of the understanding, and is not necessarily part of the reality behind the realm of representation.
Negatively postulating the qualities of the reality behind representation, speculating what it is like in
virtue of its difference from the phenomenal, allows Schopenhauer to make ''the transition from the
phenomenon to the thing-in-itself, given up by Kant as impossible''59 and open the door to meaningful
metaphysical speculation.
Platonic Ideas and Schopenhauer's pessimism
To account for the ''different grades of the will's objectification''60 which have a pre-Darwinian
structure ''form[ing]  a  pyramid of which the highest  point  is  man''61,  Schopenhauer  introduces  the
notion of Platonic Ideas to stand for ''the eternal form of things''62. An important difference between
Plato and Schopenhauer was that Plate believed in two worlds, whereas Schopenhauer believed in one
world with two aspects. For Plato, they resided in the higher, ultimate reality, but, as Magee points out,
for Schopenhauer the ''Ideas cannot be ultimate but they can be intermediate. Furthermore, if plural,
they must be within the phenomenal world,  not outside it''63.  However,  they cannot be within the
phenomenal world as they do not ''enter... into time and space, the medium of individuals, they remain
fixed, subject to no change, always being, never having become''64. This may appear problematic in so
far as the Ideas are at home in neither of the world's two aspects. Schopenhauer makes this intelligible
by considering the Ideas to be the ''unattained patterns''  of the will's  objectifications65,  ''or as their
prototypes''66.
Schopenhauer emphasises similarities between Platonic Ideas and the Kantian thing-in-itself, as
both are approaches to a relation between the one and the many; ''they are like two entirely different
paths leading to one goal''67. For Plato it is how the single Idea relates the plurality of its instantiations,
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while  for  Kant  it  is  relating  the  plurality  of  phenomena  to  the  unity  of  the  transcendent  reality.
However, ''Idea and thing-in-itself are not for us absolutely one and the same''68. The thing-in-itself is
''free from all the forms that adhere to knowledge as such''69 whereas the Platonic Ideas are ''cognitive
objects for a thinking subject''70.
The various grades of phenomenally objectified Ideas forms a nested hierarchy, where each tier
is subject to both a perpetual internal conflict and subjugated to the higher tiers; ''everywhere in nature
we see contest,  struggle,  and the fluctuation of victory''71.  This  endless struggle is  for  the limited
amount  of  matter  which  is  needed  for  the  objectification  of  Ideas.  It  is  a  struggle  between  the
instantiations of the Ideas, rather than the particular Ideas themselves. The instantiations attempt to
''snatch the matter  from one another,  for  each wishes  to  reveal  its  own Idea.  This  contest  can be
followed through the whole of nature; indeed only through it does nature exist''72.
At the bottom of the hierarchy are the forces of nature, which compete over inorganic matter.
For example, a ''magnet that has lifted up a piece of iron keeps up a perpetual struggle with gravitation
which, as the lowest objectification of the will, has a more original right to the matter of that iron'' 73.
This  takes  place  completely  without  motivation.  ''Here  we  see  at  the  very  lowest  grade  the  will
manifesting itself as a blind impulse, an obscure, dull urge, remote from all direct knowableness. It is
the simplest and feeblest mode of its objectification''74. Organic matter is more complex, with plants
and animals competing for the matter required for sustenance, generally found contained within other
organic life. We can easily observe that ''every animal can maintain its existence only by the incessant
elimination  of  another's.  Thus  the  will-to-live  generally  feasts  on  itself''75.  This  contestation  of
resources defines animal life, such that ''essentially all life is suffering''76. As the highest manifestation
of the will humans are in a position to dominate the lower tiers of the hierarchy of nature, subjugating
the realms of organic and inorganic matter. It almost goes without saying that the over-populated realm
of human beings is wrought with internal conflict, locked in a perpetual struggle for resources and
competitions for the satisfaction of individual goals. The will-to-life is that which governs all action,
guiding it towards what is required for life: ''as what the will wills is always life... it is immaterial and a
mere pleonasm if, instead of simply saying 'the will,' we say 'the will-to-live' ''77. The will-to-life, the
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reality behind all phenomenal representation, sets the stage for a realm of nature which can only exist
in a violent perpetual competition.
Any satisfactions we find when indulging our individual will  is  necessarily short  lived.  As
Schopenhauer bleakly puts it, satisfaction ''is always like the alms thrown to a beggar, which reprieves
him today so that his misery may be prolonged till tomorrow''78. The will is constantly demanding; ''so
long  as  our  consciousness  is  filled  by  our  will...  we  never  obtain  lasting  happiness  or  peace''79.
Satisfaction is so hard to come by because for willing as such there is no goal to be satisfied. Thus if
someone ''were asked why he wills generally, or why in general he wills to exist, he would have no
answer;  indeed,  the question would seem to him absurd''80.  The ''absence of all  aim,  of all  limits,
belongs to the essential nature of the will itself, which is an endless striving... Every attained end is at
the same time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum''81. This perpetual restlessness and
lack of definite goals, whereby ''willing as a whole has no end in view''82, is apparent in humans in their
fluctuation between a state of desire and striving on the one hand, and boredom on the other. Once a
goal is achieved, it is forgotten in place of a new one. Human life, indeed all  organic life, is,  for
Schopenhauer, a profoundly miserable and unsatisfying condition. The entire world of representation
we engage with is the manifestation of a restless and insatiable will. That there is no overarching goal
which could justify such a violently discordant world is the basis of Schopenhauer's moral pessimism.
The most obvious objection to this is from a moral optimist, who refers to those  privileged
humans who seem to be born and raised in circumstances which provide nothing but happiness and
opportunities  for  development.  However,  such  a  view  is  too  narrow  for  two  reasons.  First,  the
individual  surely  suffers  from  the  same  cycle  of  ''desire,  frustration,  greater  desire,  satiety  and
boredom, even in the very best of circumstances''83. Second, such a wealthy and healthy individual is
vastly outnumbered by those who find life unsatisfying; whether it's the people who have missed the
opportunities the lucky one has taken or the countless instances of plant and animal life which are
consumed for their nourishment. Schopenhauer provides a concise summary of the bleakness of human
existence with its unavoidable suffering:
The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its
form. If, which is very difficult, we have succeeding in removing pain in this form, it
at  once  appears  on  the scene  in  a  thousand others,  varying  according  to  age  and
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circumstances, such as sexual impulse, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety,
ambition, avarice, sickness, and so on. Finally, if  it  cannot find entry in any other
shape, it comes in the sad,  grey garment of weariness, satiety, and boredom, against
which many different attempts are made. Even if we ultimately succeed in driving
these away, it will hardly be done without letting pain in once again in one of the
previous forms, and thus starting the dance once more at  the beginning;  for every
human life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and boredom84.
Respite from the will-to-life through acquaintance with the Ideas
In the regrettably concise section 34 of the first edition, Schopenhauer enters into a discussion
of how we can become acquainted with the Ideas and the metaphysical implications this has. The Ideas
are the most direct phenomenal manifestations of the Will; ''only the Idea is the adequate objectivity of
the  Will''85.  The  Ideas  are  not  something  that  we  can  know through  philosophical  reflection,  nor
through any normal, direct perception. A special perceptual state is required in which the subject ''rests
in fixed contemplation of the object presented to it out of its connection with any other, and rises into
this''86. We need to
devote the whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves completely therein...
and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as
though the object  alone existed without anyone to perceive it,  and thus we are no
longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become
one,  since  the  entire  consciousness  is  filled  and  occupied  by  a  single  image  of
perception87.
Entering into this state of intense contemplative reflection, becoming a ''pure subject'', dissolves
the distinction between object and subject as ''both are of entirely equal weight''88. When reflecting on
this, we come to realise that
As will,  outside the representation and all  its  forms, it  is  one and the same in the
contemplated object and in the individual who soars aloft in this contemplation, who
becomes conscious of himself as pure subject. Therefore in themselves these two are
not different; for in themselves they are the will that here knows itself89.
Plurality and difference vanish as ''knowledge, the world as representation, is abolished'' and
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the individuality of both subject and object are replaced by ''mere will, blind impulse''90. The purity of
this state is of immense importance for Schopenhauer, as the subject is ''free from individuality and
from servitude to the will''91. This state is ''the finest part of life, its purest joy, just because it lifts us
out  of  real  existence  and  transforms  us  into  disinterested  spectators  of  it''92.  A respite  from  the
tempestuous world of will, and the endless cycle of suffering within it, is thereby offered, providing a
hint of optimism after the bleakness of the second book.
Aesthetic contemplation and the artistic genius
As we are phenomenal manifestations of the Will, ''it is all the same whether we pursue or flee,
fear harm or aspire to enjoyment; care for the constantly demanding will, no matter in what form, fills
and moves consciousness; but without peace and calm, true well-being is absolutely impossible''93.
Fortunately,  the  aesthetic  contemplation  of  the  beauty  of  art  and  nature  allows  for  the  peaceful
acquaintance with the Ideas.  The subject contemplating beautiful objects ''considers things without
interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively; it is entirely given up to them in so far as they are
merely representations, and not motives''94. While in this state, we escape from the pressures of our
individual will. Art ''repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, the essential
and abiding element in all the phenomena of the world... Its only source is knowledge of the Ideas; its
sole aim is communication of this knowledge''95.
Successful works of art are those which allow the spectator to share the genius's perceptions.
The genius possess ''a measure of the power of knowledge... far exceeding that required for the service
of an individual will''96. This surplus of knowledge allows for greater and more frequent use of the
ability to enter into the pure contemplation required for the intuition of the Ideas, such that the artist
becomes a ''subject purified of will, the clear mirror of the inner nature of the world''97. This ability is
to an extent present in everyone, ''as otherwise they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art
as of producing them''98, but the genius possesses it in a far greater degree. The ''man of genius'' then
deploys their faculty of ''imagination, in order to see in things not what nature has actually formed, but
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what she endeavoured to form, yet did not bring about because of the conflict of her forms with one
another''99. The artist's use of thoughtful intelligence allows them to recognise ''in the individual thing
its Idea, he, so to speak, understands nature's half-spoken words. He expresses clearly what she merely
stammers''100.
The  successful  works  of  art  are  those  which  ''accommodate  themselves''  to  the  spectator's
transition into pure perception; ''in other words, when by their manifold and at the same time definite
and distinct form they easily become representatives of their Ideas, in which beauty, in the objective
sense, consists''101. Schopenhauer presents a hierarchy of arts, in which the degree of beauty a form can
potentially  express  is  determined  by the  underlying  Idea's  complexity.  Architecture  is  the  lowest,
though still highly capable, form of art, as the Ideas it concerns are those of ''weight, rigidity, and
cohesion'' and how they compete with gravity102. Sculpture is capable of displaying greater beauty, as it
presents the more complex Ideas of humans by portraying their physical beauty and grace of temporal
movements103.  Painting  is  higher  still  though  this  has  its  own internal  hierarchy,  from the  Dutch
still-life painting,  of which Schopenhauer provides a somewhat questionable critique based on the
foodstuffs  depicted  interrupting  contemplation  due  to  ''our  being  positively  forced  to  think  of  its
edibility''104,  up  to  historical  painting,  which  has  as  its  subject,  in  addition  to  beauty  and  grace,
''character [which is] the manifestation of the will at the highest grade of its objectification''105. Tragic
poetry  is  the  highest  of  all  the  art  forms  which  represent  phenomena,  providing  an  unflinching
portrayal of the ''unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind... and here is to be found
a significant hint as to the nature of the world and of existence''106. In tragedy, ''it is one and the same
will... whose phenomena fight with one another and tear one another to pieces''107. The tragic hero will
renounce the ambitions and pleasures of their life and will ''die purified by suffering''108. Tragic art
reveals both the terrible nature of human existence and provides an instructive figure to inspire our
acceptance of that nature; it is both diagnostic and prescriptive.
Music  is  its  own artistic  category,  holding a  very  special  place  in  Schopenhauer's  system.
Unlike the other arts, music is not a representation of any phenomena. By not containing ''the copy, the
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repetition, of any Idea of the inner nature of the world''109, music bypasses the world as representation
altogether and expresses ''only the inner nature, the in-itself, of every phenomena, the will itself'' 110.
Schopenhauer's treatment of music is one of the most enduring aspects of his philosophy, though it
does appear questionable. For example, if beauty is the clear expression of an Idea then music, which
is not concerned with them, can not be said to be beautiful.
One of the most fascinating aspects of Schopenhauer's rich treatment of art is his treatment of
the sublime, which he considers a particular type of beauty. The sublime is the emotional response of
the subject to those phenomena which threaten to overwhelm them, which can happen in two ways;
''they  [the  phenomena]  may  threaten  it  by  their  might  that  eliminates  all  resistance,  or  their
immeasurable greatness may reduce it to nought''111. The former is dynamically sublime and clearly
interests Schopenhauer more, while the latter is mathematically sublime. The threat posed by such
phenomena must not be perceived as being against the subject as an individual, as the individual will
''would  at  once  gain  the  upper  hand.  The  peace  of  contemplation  would  become impossible,  the
impression of the sublime would be lost, because it had yielded to anxiety, in which the effort of the
individual  to  save  himself  supplanted  every  other  thought''112.  In  order  to  feel  the  sublime,  the
phenomena must  be perceived as  a  threat  to  ''human willing  general,  in  so far  as  it  is  expressed
universally through its objectivity, the human body''113.
A  feeling  of  the  sublime  is  possible  during  the  observation  of  a  surprising  range  of
phenomenon. For example, it is present, albeit weakly, in winter landscapes in which the light of the
sun carries no warmth and so demonstrates ''the absence of the principle of life''114. The solitude of
barren landscapes invite contemplation, but also reminds the subject of how dependent the human will
is on phenomenal objects for its activity. A desert landscape ''takes on a fearful character''115 because of
the startling absence of organic phenomena needed for human subsistence. A scene of tempestuous
nature offers an even greater feeling of the sublime as the individual is ''helpless against powerful
nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothing in face of stupendous forces''116. In the
face of such danger, the aesthetically reflecting subject contemplates the Ideas of those threatening
phenomenon and, in forgetting his individual willing, becomes ''the eternal, serene subject of knowing,
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who as the condition of every object is the supporter of this whole world''117.
The mental demands on the genius
By looking at Schopenhauer's treatments of the individual arts, it is apparent that the depiction
of Ideas does not necessarily entail a depiction of Schopenhauerian pessimism. For example, still-life
paintings of animals and plants appear to be fairly innocuous. It is simply false to state that all art is
pessimistic and that all artists suffer for their vocation, or at least that they suffer to the same degree.
However,  it  is clear that Schopenhauer holds the highest regard for those artists who take it  upon
themselves to depict  the Ideas of those phenomenon which express the will's  nature most clearly.
These are the artists who concentrate on the sublime, particularly the dynamically sublime, and the
human. It is upon these artists that the attention will now be focused.
It is difficult to comprehend the difficulty of the life that such an artistic genius is faced with. It
is questionable whether the fact that they are born with their abilities is best considered a blessing or a
curse. The naturally well-endowed capacity for intuition provides the genius with a sensitivity to the
nature of reality, and for the Schopenhauerian artist who decides to take human existence as his subject
matter this can only be painful.
The  artist  frequently  enters  into  aesthetic  contemplation  of  the  human  Idea,  gaining  an
extraordinary  awareness  of  how  savage,  unsatisfied,  purposeless  and  profoundly  miserable  its
manifestations are. As a phenomenal manifestation of the Idea of the human, the artist must surely see
that this applies to himself as well  as others. With this knowledge, the artist  then absorbs himself
(Schopenhauer believed females were not capable of the sustained contemplative states required of an
artist) in the creation of works which reflect this terrible state. After this harrowing contemplation of
humanity, the producer of tragedy, ''the summit of poetic art''118, commits himself to the creation of a
work which reflects ''The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of
wickedness, the scornful mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent''119.
The tragedian appears to be under a tremendous amount of strain. First, he is predisposed to
contemplate the Idea of the human and the unhappiness of its  manifestations.  Second,  he absorbs
himself in the creation of a bleak representation of his insights. The artist of the dynamically sublime is
in  a  similar  situation.  After  fixating  on  those  phenomenon  which  could  easily  overwhelm  and
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annihilate the human in its bodily objectivity, the artist must absorb himself in depicting these scenes.
To make matters worse, in addition to the horrors they are exposed to, the artist is faced with
the frustrations of representing their  intuitions of Ideas via the medium of imperfect phenomenon.
They must work within the world of phenomena in order to communicate the truth of their essentially
non-phenomenal  intuitions.  As  Krukowski  neatly  summarises,  ''the  process  of  art-making  must
incorporate the processes of a world that art's content gives reason to abandon''.120
Given what the genius is exposed to and the creative tasks he takes upon himself, it is a wonder
that he does not descend into a state of madness. Indeed, it  is in the treatment of the genius that
Schopenhauer undertakes a controlled digression to discuss madness and its proximity to genius. The
genius can often appear to ''exhibit several weaknesses that actually are closely akin to madness''121,
such as an ''animation, amounting to disquietude... since the present can seldom satisfy them, because
it does not fill their consciousness. This gives them that restless nature''122. Their behaviour takes on the
appearance of irrationality, as they are ''often subject to violent emotions and irrational passions'' 123 as
their conduct is guided by their absorption in focused perception rather than adhering to a conceptual
structure. They also have an inclination to soliloquize. So it seems, then, that it is not only difficult to
be a genius, but it is also difficult to be around one. Such behaviour would surely isolate the genius,
thus making Schopenhauer's figure of the genius cohere with the Romantic notion of the solitary,
tortured artistic genius. It such considerations which compel Schopenhauer to note that ''genius and
madness have a side where they touch and even pass over into each other''124.
The point  of contact  identified by Schopenhauer  is  the inclination of both to disregard the
principle of sufficient reason; that is, the various forms of causality which govern the relations between
phenomenal objects. The genius demonstrates this by focusing on the Ideas intuited in perception, and
subsequently  ''neglect[s]  a  consideration  of  his  own path  in  life,  and  therefore  pursues  this  with
insufficient skill''125.  The artistic genius has an inadequate grasp of how his phenomenal existence
relates the people and objects around him. The madman also exhibits a tenuous grasp of the principle
of sufficient reason, though this is through a failure to make connections between temporal events: ''the
madman correctly knows the individual present as well as many particulars of the past, but... he fails to
recognize the connection, the relations, and therefore goes astray and talks nonsense''126. 
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Schopenhauer's  discussion of  this  focuses  on the issue of memory,  and its  ability  to make
''continuous  connexion being abolished''127. Memory does not fail the individual altogether, with the
exception of the worst cases where the ''mad person's knowledge has in common with the animal's the
fact that both are restricted to the present''128. The individual whose memory of a series of events is
fractured fills in the gaps with imaginary events, and it is the ''influence of this false past [which] then
prevents the use of the correctly known present''129. Schopenhauer remarkably attributes the fracturing
of  one's  memory  of  events  to  the  individual's  inability  to  cope  with  an  event  which  has  such  a
magnitude of suffering that ''nature... seizes on madness as the last means of saving life''130. If there is a
strong enough association of sorrow with the memory of an event, the ''mind, tormented so greatly,
destroys, as it were, the thread of its memory, fills up the gaps with fictions, and thus seeks refuge in
madness from the mental suffering that exceeds it strength''131.
Schopenhauer's  treatment  of  madness  is  remarkable  though it  is  not  clear  how the  artistic
genius is able to maintain a consistent memory throughout his exposure to the horrors of the world as
will, resisting the minds submission to madness. The absorption in the perception of Ideas generates
the  behavioural oddities described above, such as restlessness, agitation and soliloquizing, and this
presumably applies to all great artists. For instance, the Dutch still-life painter will demonstrate this
behaviour while contemplating the Ideas of the objects of his study. Schopenhauer can be criticised at
this  point for failing to draw a hierarchy of the types of artistic  genius which corresponds to  the
hierarchy of the arts. Surely the creative genius behind the most harrowing tragedies is of a different
type, beyond the perception of Ideas, than that behind the Dutch still-life paintings. The tragedian or
artist of the sublime is exposed to Ideas which are horrifying in addition to beautiful. It is these artists
who will have the closest proximity to madness, yet it is not clear what prevents them from crossing its
border. Their embracing the terrifying nature of their subject matter would certainly put them closer to
madness than the architect, who is concerned with the far simpler Ideas of the forces which govern
matter. However, it is not clear what distinguishes the character of the producers of the most harrowing
works of art from that of the madman such that the former does not have nature make the intervention
of madness to cope with the horrors they are exposed to. If the madman's madness is induced by
phenomenal horrors,  then surely the artist  would be driven mad by the more profound horrors of
non-phenomenal reality?
One initial response could be that the artistic genius is so frequently exposed to the horrors of
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the world as will that they become, to an extent, desensitised, which allows them cope with events
which would be traumatic  for  anyone else.  However,  Schopenhauer's  discussion of  the  individual
character  suggests  that  this  may  not  be  so.  One's  character  is  a  ''particularly  and  individually
constituted''  instance  of  the  will  which  cannot  be  known a  priori,  and  as  such  is  considered  an
empirical  character132.  The  character  of  others,  as  well  as  ourselves,  is  knowable  only  through
experience.  This  character  is  within  the  world  of  phenomenon,  and,  being  a  phenomena itself,  is
governed  by  laws  of  causality  and  is  ''like  the  natural  forces...  original,  unchangeable,  and
inexplicable''.133 The  character  of  an  individual  is  inborn,  ''the  work  of  nature  itself''.134 It  is  also
constant: ''it remains the same, through the whole of life''.135 An individual may change their goals as
they progress through life, but this is attributable only to a change in circumstances; the underlying
motivations, governed by character, will remain the same. The commonsense notion of freedom is a
myth. There is a transcendental freedom in the sense that we are instantiations of the metaphysical will
which  is  by  definition  unconstrained.  However,  the  way  in  which  we  are  manifest  defines  the
parameters within which we can act. We can pursue the things that we want within these parameters,
but we cannot change the things that we want. If character is determined then the ability to develop a
stronger character sufficient to cope adequately with the horrors of the world is not an option. It is not
the case that we can decide to want to be able to better withstand trauma and aim towards this goal. It
seems then that the madman is born within an innate weakness in their ability to cope with trauma,
while the genius has an innate strength. The genius, with his heightened faculty of perception and
imagination,  sees  the Idea  behind the dynamically  sublime which others  may find terrifying.  The
madman lacks this  faculty and focuses on the threat  to himself  as phenomenal individual.  As the
character is knowable only through experience, it  is only by coming up against the horrific or the
dynamically sublime in its most threatening that we find out which side of the distinction an individual
is closest to.
However, this seems like an unsatisfactory explanation of the point of distinction between the
two as it raises a further, broader, issue within Schopenhauer's aesthetics. This is the relation between
the empirical subject of ordinary perception, i.e. what we would typically assume to be meant by the
term 'self', and the subject of aesthetic reflection. There is room for a distinction between these two
notions of subject because the former seems defined by its relation to an object.
The empirical character is an individual phenomenal instantiation of the metaphysical will, and
132 SCHOPENHAUER, A. One the Freedom of the Will, p. 49.
133 Ibid., p. 49.
134 Ibid., p. 55.
135 Ibid., p. 51.
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all  of the behaviour demonstrated by it is in relation to the rest of the world of phenomena. This
distinction of subject and object is essential for the empirical self: I, that is, as an individual instance of
willing,  desire  this object and want it  to be my own. However,  Schopenhauer  is  clear that  in the
aesthetic  experience  this  distinction  is  no  longer  present;  ''we  are  no  longer  able  to  separate the
perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, since the entire consciousness is filled
and occupied  by a  single  image of  perception''136.  As our  attention  shifts  to  the Ideas  behind the
objects,  we ''continue  to  exist  only as  pure subject''137.  We cease to  be  the empirical  character  of
ordinary experience, becoming something significantly different as we disregard individual willing to
facilitate aesthetic reflection.
The issue of concern regarding this distinction is to do with the continuity between them. If we
take Schopenhauer's  claims literally  and accept  that  aesthetic  reflection temporarily  disregards the
empirical  subject,  such  that  the  reflecting  individual's  notion  of  self-hood requires  revision,  there
appears  to  be a  fragmentation,  or  at  least  interruption,  of  the  subject's  continuity  of  self.  This  is
important for his discussion of the genius, who is so frequently engaged in aesthetic reflection. The
genius  accordingly  has  a  double  identity;  as  a  human  individual  he  is  defined  by  his  empirical
character, while as the creator of successful art he is defined by his escaping his empirical character.
These seem to be mutually incompatible so it appears as though a contradiction may be present.
If we accept that the genius suffers from a discontinuity of self then he appears to be close to
the madman. The madman has gaps in the history of his empirical character which are filled by fictions
of the mind as a refuge from the horrific, while the genius has gaps in his empirical character which
are filled by the aesthetic state. When reflecting on the dynamically sublime or the tragic, the genius's
reflection is also a response to the horrific. The madman's interruption of self regards memory, while
that  of  the  genius  seems to  be  a  kind of  schizophrenia.  However,  such a  criticism is  to  misread
Schopenhauer. It is clear that the subjects of empirical character and aesthetic reflection are intimately
related as the continuity of memory between the two is present, which suggests that there is a more
fundamental self of which the empirical character and states of aesthetic reflection are moments.
The Individual Will
If there is an aspect of the individual which underlies both empirical character and aesthetic
reflection,  allowing for memory to  bridge the transitions between them, it  is  outside the realm of
consciousness as it is something we do not have access to. This, for Schopenhauer, is the metaphysical
136 WWV, I, 178-9.
137 WWV, I, 178.
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will of which are individual phenomenal manifestations, determining our dispositions, the ways we
respond to stimuli, the purposes we ascribe to our actions, etc. This allows for the continuity between
the empirical subject and subject of aesthetic reflection, but it is not necessarily a desirable response.
John Atwell questions the coherency of the will creating, or manifesting, as something which allows
for itself to be interrupted. This is indeed a concern, as Schopenhauer frequently claims that the will is
a  striving  for  continued  existence,  manifest  as  the  sexual  preoccupation  of  animal  behaviour  for
example. That it should allow for the cessation of itself is a kind of self-destructiveness at odds with its
blind urge for reproduction. Atwell claims that Schopenhauer takes this as ''an undeniable fact... even
when doing so threatens to pose a contradiction to his original and perhaps basic account of things''138.
A response to this apparent contradiction could be to claim that Schopenhauer did not argue for
a complete cessation of willing in aesthetic reflection. If the subject becomes the mirror of the object,
as Schopenhauer is fond of saying, then surely the will of the object is reflected also. Such reflection is
allowed  by  the  in-itself  of  both  subject  and  object  being  metaphysically  identical  while  having
superficial phenomenal differences. The individual will of the subject ceases while the metaphysical
will of each continues:
in themselves these two are not different; for in themselves they are the will that here
knows  itself...  As  soon  as  knowledge,  the  world  as  representation,  is  abolished,
nothing in general is left but mere will, blind impulse139.
So, contrary to Atwell's criticism, it can be argued that the will does not set itself up for its own
cessation  and  the  contradiction  in  aesthetic  reflection  is  resolved,  and  a  continuity  between  the
empirical subject and subject of reflection is enabled. In Atwell's defence, the contradiction seems to
re-emerge in Schopenhauer's discussion of how the genius imaginatively completes the Idea of the
objects experienced in the past. Through the recollection of the object and contemplation of its Idea,
''we are able to produce the illusion that only those objects are present, not we ourselves... Then the
world as representation alone remains; the world as will has disappeared''140. Although Schopenhauer
does say here the will disappears, it is also important that he refers to this as an illusion. It remains
another instance of the will knowing itself.
To recapitulate, if we accept the continuity of the will underlying both the subject's empirical
character and state of aesthetic reflection, as Schopenhauer argues in the above quotations, then the
138 ATWELL, J. ''Art as Liberation: A Central Theme of Schopenhauer's Philosophy'', p. 84.
139 WWV, I, 180.
140 WWV, I, 199.
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genius does not suffer from the same disruptions in their personal history of the madman. Both the
madman and the genius suffer from gaps in the history of their empirical character, which is what
makes them seem so closely related. However, accepting the will as the common underlying factor
throughout  the  interruptions  of  the  genius's  empirical  character  means  that  a  unity  is  provided
throughout the changes in subjective states.
There are problems with this view of the relation between the will and the empirical character,
elucidated by Gardener. According to this view, we as empirical characters are ''reduced to the status of
mere spectators, in the strictest sense, of the workings of that inner nature which... we know in an
immediate and non-perceptual manner to be ours''.141 As we have to empirically discover what our
character is, Gardiner suggests that it is ''cut off from me, in the way in which the will of another is
separate from me''.142 Young responds to this by pointing out that we have ''an epistemic relation to my
own  psychological  states  which  is  unique  and  different  from  my  relation  to  the  inner  states  of
another''.143 While agreeing with Schopenhauer that there are aspects of our will which are discovered
empirically, he maintains that there are also aspects which have a first-person experiential significance
such as emotional responses to the world - these are ''objects of immediate, non-inferential awareness
so that it is not [Schopenhauer's] position that my access to all my ''willing'' is just the same as that of
another person''.144 This is argued for explicitly by Schopenhauer, such as the claim that ''About himself
everyone knows directly, about everything else only very indirectly''145.
However, Gardiner argues that such a response is to present Schopenhauer with a dilemma. Our
self-knowledge  now  has  two  aspects:  ''non-perceptual  awareness  of  ourselves  as  will  and  the
perceptual knowledge we have of our own behaviour''.146 The dilemma is in relying on the former
aspect  to  dispel  the  claim that  we are  mere  spectators  of  our  own character.  The non-perceptual
knowledge required, which Young attempts to argue for, suggest that the will is something of which we
can  have  experience.  This  contradicts  Schopenhauer's  claims  that  the  will  is  beyond  experiential
knowledge,  that  the  will  is  noumenal  rather  than  phenomenal.  If  something  is  known  through
experience,  it  is  subject  to  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  and  subsequently  cannot  amount  to
knowledge of the thing-in-itself.
This  issue  of  the  adequacy  of  our  knowledge  of  the  will  is  relevant  to  the  discussion  of
Schopenhauer's aesthetics because if our knowledge is not adequate, then the claim that it is the will
141 GARDINER, P. Schopenhauer, p. 168.
142 Ibid.
143 YOUNG, J. Willing and Unwilling, p. 60.
144 Ibid.
145 WWV, II, 192.
146 GARDINER, P. Schopenhauer, p. 172.
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which  provides  coherency  to  the  changes  between  empirical  character  and  the  state  of  aesthetic
reflection appears somewhat vacuous. In light of this we are entitled to question how satisfactory it is
for the interruptions in the history of the genius's empirical character to be resolved by appeal to the
unknowable will, compared to the interruptions of the personal history of the madman being filled by
fictions.
Schopenhauer discusses the inadequacy of our knowledge of the will in the chapter entitled ''On
the Possibility of Knowing the Thing-in-Itself''. Here he states that ''even the inward observation we
have of our own will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the
thing-in-itself''147.  The inner knowledge we have is closer to adequacy than knowledge based upon
external phenomena, as it ''is free from two forms belonging to outer knowledge, the form of space and
the form of causality''148. However, the form of time remains. As such, the principle of sufficient reason
is still in play, preventing wholly adequate knowledge of the will and thus that which provides the
sought unity through genius's changes between subjective states.
Schopenhauer argues that in ''self-consciousness the known, consequently the will, must be the
first and original thing; the knower, on the other hand, must be only the secondary thing, that which
has been added, the mirror''149. However, since the will which is primary to the self cannot be known
adequately, the I is ''not intimate with itself through and through... but is opaque, and therefore remains
a riddle to itself''150.
Conclusion
The genius contemplates the Ideas and encounters with the sublime, the most insightful being
the Idea of the the human and the dynamically sublime, and represents it in the form of artwork. To
make the most successful art, the genius must have had a sufficient amount of encounters with the
horrific. While the madman copes with the horrific by creating a blank in his personal history and
filling it with fictions, the interruptions of the genius's personal history as an empirical subject are
filled with moments of aesthetic reflection. This state is radically different to the empirical subject, and
issues regarding their relation seem to be resolved with the notion of the metaphysical will being that
which allows for continuity between the states of subjectivity.
However, in light of the discussion of the inadequacy of our knowledge of the will, the appeal
147 WWV, II, 196.
148 WWV, II, 197.
149 WWV, II, 202.
150 WWV, II, 197.
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to it for a source of continuity between the empirical subject of individual willing and the pure subject
of aesthetic reflection seems unsatisfactory. It is difficult to argue against Schopenhauer's claims that
the will is beyond the reach of human knowledge; that despite being able to remove the forms of space
and causality the form of time remains and prevents the acquisition of adequate knowledge. If this is
the case, that which is fundamental to human character remains an unknown entity. The will remains
sealed off from human knowledge and its explanatory function appears to be weakened. If we thus
reject the will as a satisfactory account of the continuity of the genius's individuality throughout the
changes in subjectivity, Schopenhauer's aesthetics seems to have a weakness at the core of one its most
important aspects. Indeed, the role of the will in explaining the character of individuals seems to be
analogous to the laws he claims are produced by natural science; the postulation of an unknowable
force which remains a mystery.
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